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In this paper, we estimate willingness to pay for curbside recycling. Using a unique data
set, we also test for and detect significant hypothetical bias using stated and revealed
preference data. A short-scripted “cheap talk” statement is used to mitigate the bias and
provide more efficient estimates of the welfare impacts of curbside recycling programs.
Key words: cheap talk, contingent valuation, curbside recycling, hypothetical bias

David Aadland and Arthur Caplan are assistant professors in the economics department at
Utah State University.
We thank Patricia Gwartney (director), Emery Smith (programmer), and other
employees of the University of Oregon’s Survey Research Laboratory for conducting the
survey for this study. We also thank two anonymous referees, Peter Berck, Paul Jakus,
Therese Grijalva, Nicholas Flores, John Whitehead, John Loomis, Robert Berrens, Lynn
Hunnicutt, John Keith, Tracy Turner, and participants at the University of Colorado’s
Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop, 2001 for comments on earlier
versions of the paper. Ryan Bosworth provided graduate research assistance. The USU

2

Research Initiative Program provided research funds. This research was also supported
by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, Utah.

3

WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR CURBSIDE RECYCLING WITH
DETECTION AND MITIGATION OF HYPOTHETICAL BIAS

Recycling in the United States has increased dramatically in the past decade.
Nationwide, municipalities recycle approximately 32% of their solid waste, up from 8%
in 1990. Likewise, the number of community curbside recycling programs (CRPs) has
increased eight fold, to approximately 9,250 programs (Goldstein and Madtes). Despite
these national trends in recycling, many CRPs in the western United States are losing
money or are not retaining earnings adequate for future growth. For example, in Utah
two of the state’s nine CRPs are not covering their costs, and none of the other seven
programs are retaining adequate earnings.1 While there are well-known cost-side
explanations for this lack of earnings–e.g. high collection, processing, and shipping costs
relative to materials prices, and lower landfill tip fees (Glenn)–the benefits associated
with curbside recycling are not as well understood.
In order for local policymakers to make informed decisions about whether to
initiate or maintain a CRP, they need reliable estimates of households’ maximum
willingness to pay (WTP) for the service, as well as the household- and
community-specific characteristics that influence WTP. For voluntary CRPs in particular
(where households pay for the service only if they have signed up for it), information
regarding its value to households will enable community planners to estimate the
relationship between changes in fees and participation rates⎯a crucial determinant of
sustained profitability. A primary aim of this paper is to accurately estimate this
relationship using contingent valuation methods (CVM).
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There is an active debate regarding the reliability of CVM, and more specifically
the issue of hypothetical bias from stated-preference methods (e.g. Arrow et al.;
Hanemann; and Diamond and Hausman). The potential for hypothetical bias arises
whenever people are asked to state or select a maximum amount they are willing to pay
for a good or service, even though they will not have to actually pay for it.2 To detect
and mitigate the effects of this bias, researchers have recently used two methods. The
first combines results of actual market outcomes (i.e., revealed preference (RP) data) with
stated preference (SP) data (henceforth, the RP-SP method). Examples of this method
include Whitehead, Haab, and Huang; Nestor; Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams; and
Cameron (1992). The second involves innovations in survey design.
Our sample consists of over 1,000 households from the state of Utah who were
asked to value either their actual CRP, or a hypothetical program if their community does
not currently provide one. The sample includes both RP and SP information from
households that have chosen whether to participate in an actual CRP, as well as SP
information from non-participating households that either do not have a CRP available in
their community or are unaware of its existence. This unique nature of our data set
enables us to test for hypothetical bias using two distinct approaches to the RP-SP
method.
In the first approach, we use a sub-sample of data from two groups: (1)
households that have already made a decision about whether to participate in an actual
voluntary CRP and (2) households that are making a decision about whether to
participate in a hypothetical CRP. Because the CRPs facing each group are similar in
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their attributes, and because we control for differences across these two groups, any
between-group difference in the likelihood of CRP participation is suggestive of
hypothetical bias. This is a direct RP-SP comparison because we have information on
actual household participation decisions rather than indirect information on preferences,
such as that provided by travel costs.
The second RP-SP approach is a comparison of households’ actual participation
decisions in voluntary CRP communities with their own stated WTP responses. This
approach is similar in spirit to Whitehead, Haab, and Huang; and Huang, Haab, and
Whitehead, who detect and control for hypothetical bias by using information from the
same individuals concerning actual number of recreation trips at current quality (RP data)
and expected number of trips at current and improved qualities (SP data). The advantage
of this approach is that it avoids (1) the need to control for differences between two
groups of households, and (2) potential sample-selection problems.
The other method for detecting and mitigating hypothetical bias involves
innovations in survey design. Recent innovations include: (1) reminder statements of
substitutes, budget constraints, or the hypothetical nature of the good in question (e.g.,
Loomis et al.; Cummings and Taylor; and List), (2) referendum formats (e.g., Loomis;
Alberini (1995b); Boyle et al.; and Welsh and Poe), and (3) follow-up questioning (e.g.,
Li and Mattsson; Champ et al.; Blumenschein et al.; and Berrens et al.).
Along these lines, we employ a “cheap talk” reminder statement similar in spirit
to the ones used by Cummings and Taylor and List, but closer in length to that used by
Loomis, Gonzalez-Caban, and Gregory. Cheap talk is information provided prior to the
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WTP questions reminding respondents that they are valuing a hypothetical program, and
as a result, they may inadvertently misstate their true WTP.
Previous research on cheap talk is divided over whether it matters. For example,
Cummings and Taylor find that households receiving a long-script version of cheap talk
will, on average, report lower WTP values than those that do not. They mention two yet
unpublished studies that find no significant effect of shortened cheap-talk scripts, but
nonetheless recommend reducing the script length to be more compatible with telephone
applications of CVM. Loomis, Gonzalez-Caban, and Gregory reduce the discrepancy
between hypothetical and actual WTP in laboratory experiments by issuing a short-script
reminder to their subjects that “. . . although the question is hypothetical, we want you to
answer as if it were real…” Finally, List finds that the effectiveness of long-scripted
cheap talk depends upon respondent experience with the good being valued. Similar to
List, we find that cheap talk is more effective for certain types of individuals, but unlike
List and Cummings and Taylor, we use a short-scripted version of cheap talk. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first evidence that short reminder statements can reduce
hypothetical bias and improve the efficiency of the corresponding welfare estimates in
contingent valuation surveys.
The next section presents the econometric model used to estimate our welfare
measures, as well as the specific methods used to detect and mitigate potential
hypothetical bias in our data. We then discuss our survey instrument and the data,
followed by our empirical results. The final section summarizes our findings and offers
policy recommendations.
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Methodology and Econometric Model
This section is divided into four subsections. The first subsection discusses the doublebounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) model used to obtain our welfare estimates. The
second and third introduce our explicit hypothesis for the existence of hypothetical bias
in the SP data. The fourth subsection discusses the cheap-talk hypothesis.

Econometric Model
Our econometric approach follows Cameron and James. WTP questions are set in the
DBDC format to elicit a household’s WTP through a sequence of dichotomous-choice
(i.e., yes or no) valuation questions. The first question is: “Would you be willing to pay
$τ for the service?” The opening bid τ is chosen randomly from a set of pre-determined
values.3 By randomizing the opening bid, the possible effects of “starting-point bias” are
reduced (Cameron 1988 and Alberini 1995a and b). Based on her response to the
opening bid, the respondent is then asked a similar follow-up question, but with a larger
bid, τH = 2τ, if she answered “yes” (i.e., willing to pay at least τ for the service) or a
smaller bid τL = 0.5τ if she answered “no” (i.e., unwilling to pay τ for the service).
Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up questions, the
respondent’s latent WTP may be placed in one of four regions: (-∞,τL), (τL,τ), (τ,τH) or
(τH, ∞). Unlike other CVM studies, we follow up with a third valuation question for
those who respond “no” to the first two valuation questions, that is, “Would you be
willing to use the service if it were free of charge?” Previous experience with household
recycling surveys suggests that some households apparently need to be paid (i.e., have
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negative WTP values) to participate (Haab and McConnell; and Aadland and Caplan).
As a result, our survey generates five rather than four valuation regions with (-∞, τL)
being replaced by (-∞, 0) and (0, τL).
We posit that the household’s true WTP (WTP*) is represented by the equation
(1)

,
WTP*
i = Xiβ + εi

where Xi is a row vector of household- and community-specific control variables, ∃ is a
corresponding column vector of coefficients, and εi is a normally distributed error term
for households i = 1,…,n. We allow for possible heteroscedasticity by modeling the
variance of the WTP error term as

σi2 (Zi γ ) = exp(Zi γ) ,

(2)

where Zi is a row vector of variables related to the disturbance variances and γ is a
column vector of parameters.
By assuming independence across error terms, we then form the likelihood
function conditional on (1), (2), and the observed data. Letting Φ indicate the standard
normal cumulative density function, the probability that household i’s true WTP falls in
each of the five intervals is:
(3)

P1,i = Prob(-∞ < WTPi* < 0) = Φ(−Xiβ / σi (Zi γ)) ;
P2,i = Prob(0 ≤ WTPi* < 0.5τi) = Φ((0.5τi − Xiβ) / σi (Zi γ)) - Φ(−Xiβ / σi (Zi γ)) ;

P3,i = Prob(0.5τi ≤ WTPi* < τi ) = Φ((τi − Xiβ) / σi (Zi γ)) - Φ((0.5τi − Xiβ) / σi (Zi γ)) ;
P4,i = Prob(τi ≤ WTPi* < 2τi) = Φ((2τi − Xiβ) / σi (Zi γ)) - Φ((τi − Xiβ) / σi (Zi γ)) ;
P5,i = Prob(2τi ≤ WTPi* < ∞) = 1 - Φ((2τi − Xiβ) / σi (Zi γ)) ,
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where τi represents household i’s opening bid. Using (1) through (3), the (log) likelihood
function for all households in the sample is
n

(4)
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ln(L) = ∑∑ ωj,i ln(Pj,i ) ,
i =1 j=1

where Τj,i = 1 if the stated WTP value falls in the jth region and 0 otherwise. Maximizing
the (log) likelihood function (4) results in an estimation problem requiring nonlinear
optimization techniques to generate estimates of the ∃ parameters (see Greene).4

Detecting Hypothetical Bias⎯Inter-Household Comparison
Typically, CVM researchers are unable to quantify potential hypothetical bias because
they do not observe individuals revealing their preferences through actual market
decisions. We, however, have observations both from individuals who have made a
voluntary choice of whether to participate in an actual CRP and those who were asked to
hypothetically value a similar CRP. The hypothetical program was described as follows:
. . . please imagine that you could have a service that regularly collects
paper, plastic, glass, aluminum cans, tin cans, and cardboard. Your
household would need to sort your recyclables (into groups of similar
materials) and pay a fee for the recycling service, in addition to your
current garbage collection fee.
To ensure that similar CRPs are valued in this inter-household comparison, we isolated
participating and non-participating Salt Lake City (SLC) respondents who know that a
CRP exists in their community. There is no marginal fee for the SLC program. In order
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to sign up for the service, a resident phones to initiate the service and pays a one-time $6
deposit for the recycling container. As with our hypothetical CRP, the SLC program
involves some sorting of recyclable materials and picks up materials two to four times a
month.
We then grouped these SLC respondents with the subset of respondents across the
25 communities in our sample that answered the question of whether they would
participate in the hypothetical CRP if it were free of charge.5 With this sub-sample, we
estimate a joint RP-SP probit model (controlling for household- and community-specific
effects) for the binary choice of whether or not to participate in the CRP if the service
were offered free of charge.6 Our general hypothesis for the detection of hypothetical
bias is:
H1: Respondents tend to overstate their maximum WTP for (and willingness to
participate in) a hypothetical CRP relative to an actual program.
In other words, we expect respondents who are valuing the hypothetical program to be
observed as more likely to participate (and therefore have higher implied latent WTP
values) than those making the same decision about an actual CRP with similar attributes,
all else equal. This hypothesis is tested directly by examining whether the coefficient on
an SP binary variable is statistically greater than zero in an RP-SP probit model for
whether households participate in curbside recycling or not. If it is greater than zero, we
fail to reject H1 using this approach.
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Detecting Hypothetical Bias⎯Intra-Household Comparison
A second method for testing H1 is to compare RP and SP information from the same
households. This type of intra-household comparison is possible because our survey
asked households residing in communities with a CRP whether they participate in the
program (RP data), as well as their maximum WTP for the program (SP data). We have
usable data of this type from two communities with voluntary CRPs⎯SLC and another
with a $6 monthly fee. A simple test of H1 is to examine both the frequency and
magnitude of cases where households stated a WTP greater than the monthly fee but do
not participate in the program. Evidence of this type of response behavior from
non-participants would suggest that positive hypothetical bias exists in the SP data (i.e.,
failure to reject H1). Also, note that it is possible to find cases where the respondent’s
stated WTP is less than the monthly fee but the household is participating in the program.
This type of behavior would suggest negative hypothetical bias among participants along
the lines of Carson et al. (1996).

Mitigating Hypothetical Bias
As mentioned in the Introduction, we test whether short-script cheap talk is effective in
mitigating hypothetical bias. Our cheap talk statement reads
. . . studies have shown that many people say they are willing to pay more
for curbside recycling than they actually will pay when (it/curbside
recycling) becomes available in their community. For this reason, as I
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read the next two curbside recycling fees, please imagine your household
actually paying them.
This statement is noticeably shorter than the scripts used by Cummings and Taylor and
List. By including a binary explanatory variable in (1) for those that randomly received
cheap talk (CHEAP TALK) and interacting it with several household characteristics, we
test whether our shortened cheap-talk script is effective in reducing potential response
bias among households that were asked to value the hypothetical CRP. Our hypothesis
is:
H2: CHEAP TALK will have a significant response effect, resulting in a
downward effect on estimated WTP.

Recycling Surveys and Data
We administered two surveys for this study.7 The first⎯a household survey⎯was
administered over the phone by the Oregon Survey Research Laboratory (OSRL) to
approximately 1,000 households located in 35 different communities throughout Utah
with population sizes greater than 1,000 residents.8 The communities were selected
through proportionate random sampling in order to reflect a rough one-to-three split in
the population between those communities with and without curbside recycling,
respectively. Households were then randomly sampled within each community to ensure
a roughly equal number of households with and without curbside recycling. OSRL
reports that the average survey took approximately seven minutes to conduct, and
response rates were approximately 75%. The second survey⎯a recycling coordinators
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survey⎯was also administered over the phone to each of the recycling coordinators in
the 35 communities. This survey provided background information on each of the
communities, as well as verification of the households’ responses.
We find it convenient to partition the household survey questions into four
categories. The first category includes questions regarding a household’s motivation for
recycling. The variables are (1) “whether you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the
environment” (ETHICS), (2) “whether you believe recycling saves you money by either
directly turning in recyclables or by using a smaller garbage container” (MONETARY),
and (3) “whether an ethical duty to help the environment is the primary reason why you
recycle” (PRIMARILY ETHICS). Including these variables enables us to test whether
different motivations for recycling produce systematically higher WTP values, all else
equal.
The second category includes a series of questions related to the status and
household usage of dropoff recycling in the community. Since dropoff is a substitute for
curbside recycling, we test whether certain characteristics of the dropoff-recycling
program, such as presence and usage of dropoff facilities, influence a household’s WTP
for curbside service. Variables in this category include (1) “whether or not there are
dropoff recycling facilities in the community” (DROPOFF), and (2) “whether the
household is a frequent user of the dropoff facilities” (DROPOFF USER).
Demographic variables such as age, gender, household size, membership in
environmental organizations, household income level, and education level comprise the
third category of variables. Age, income, and education levels are broken down into
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binary variables as follows: 18 ≤ Age ≤ 35 (YOUNG); Age ≥ 65 (OLD); $25,000 ≤
Income ≤ $50,000 (MEDIUM INCOME); Income ≥ $50,000 (HIGH INCOME); and
whether the highest degree earned is either a high school diploma or GED (HIGH
SCHOOL), associate’s degree (ASSOCIATE), bachelor’s degree (BACHELORS), or
master’s/doctoral/professional degree (GRADUATE).
The fourth category includes variables that elicit household valuation (or refine
the manner in which the values are elicited). As mentioned previously, with the DBDC
format households valuing the hypothetical CRP are offered a randomly chosen opening
bid value (BID) followed by additional bids scaled to the opening amount. Households
with an available CRP (whether or not they actually use it) have their opening bids
replaced by their perceived monthly fee for curbside service.9 Additional bids are then
scaled to this opening amount. As discussed above, a random sample of households
valuing the hypothetical CRP received CHEAP TALK. A subset of households to which
the hypothetical program was described, but who did not receive cheap talk, were given
the following certainty question immediately after their valuation questions: “How sure
are you of the answer you just gave to the previous question?” The options were very
sure (VERY SURE), somewhat sure (SOMEWHAT SURE), or not sure (NOT SURE).
Finally, we also create a binary variable for whether households claimed to know the
CRP fee (FEE KNOWN), as well as differences between the actual and perceived fee
(FEE UNDERSTATED and FEE OVERSTATED).
Summary statistics for each of these variables are shown in table 1. Notice that
respondents appear to recycle out of both an ethical duty to help the environment (90%)
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and to save money (80%), with an ethical duty being the primary motivation (68%). For
those respondents given the preference-certainty question, most said they were “very
sure” (47%) about their responses to the valuation questions. People residing in
communities with CRPs who stated that they knew the curbside recycling fee (45%),
mostly tended to overstate the amount by an average of $4.14 per month. Also, a little
over one third (38%) of the respondents who live in a community with dropoff facilities
consider themselves frequent dropoff users.
[Insert table 1]
In terms of demographics, our sample appears fairly representative of the Utah
population, except for an over-sampling of women. Since women tend to be willing to
pay more for curbside recycling, all else equal, the WTP of the “typical” household is
ultimately evaluated at the population average, which is approximately a 50-50 split
between men and women.

Econometric Results
We begin by estimating model (1), which combines all (n = 876) households in our
sample⎯those residing in a community without an actual CRP and those with a CRP.10
The results are also provided in table 1. First, note that the mean estimated WTP across
our entire sample is approximately $7.00 per month. This estimate is considerably higher
than those reported in Lake, Bateman, and Parfitt; Tiller, Jakus, and Park; and Aadland
and Caplan, and is higher than the current fee of all but one of the communities in our
sample whose recycling coordinators have reported inadequate earnings from their CRPs.
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Second, we find evidence of heteroscedasticity. The likelihood ratio statistic used
to test the null hypothesis that γ = 0 in (2) is 65.11 with a 5% critical value equal to 11.07.
We therefore reject the null in favor heteroscedasticity. The variables included in the Z
vector are shown in the lower portion of table 1. The coefficient on CHEAP TALK is
negative and significant at the 5% level indicating a reduced error variance for those
receiving cheap talk. This result indicates that cheap talk reminder statements, in
addition to reducing hypothetical bias for certain types of individuals, may also be
effective in reducing the uncertainty associated with stated WTP values. By construction
of the bid design, BID is also likely to be systematically related to the variance of the
latent WTP errors. Recall that the opening bids are even integers between two and 10,
with subsequent bids equal to either half or twice the opening amount. Therefore, the bid
design generates larger WTP intervals (and thus more uncertainty regarding the true
WTP) for higher opening bids. As expected, the coefficient on BID is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level.11
We also include preference-certainty variables in the spirit of Li and Mattsson.
However, since our preference-certainty information is discrete rather than continuous,
we are precluded from adopting their methodology. In contrast to Li and Mattsson, who
impose a constant variance across households, we allow households stating different
levels of certainty to have different error distributions. As table 1 shows, however, the
coefficients associated with the three preference-certainty categories are not statistically
different than zero.
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Third, we find several individual- and community-specific characteristics that are
significantly related to WTP for curbside recycling. Those willing to pay the most are
(1) young; (2) female; (3) highly educated; (4) motivated to recycle because of an ethical
duty to help the environment; (5) members of an environmental organization; (6) residing
in a large household; (7) not frequently using dropoff-recycling facilities; and
(8) overstating the current fee for their curbside service.
Most of these effects are similar to those found in Aadland and Caplan; Tiller,
Jakus, and Park; and Lake, Bateman, and Parfitt. Effects (6) and (7), however, deserve
further attention. We had no prior expectation on (6) and, therefore, entertain several
possible hypotheses regarding its sign. On the one hand, a larger household may
experience larger costs associated with organizing the recycling task among its members,
and thus is willing to pay less, all else equal. On the other hand, if the household derives
passive-use value from recycling, then its payoff will be larger due to its corresponding
generation of more recyclable materials. Our results suggest that the latter effect
outweighs the former. One explanation for effect (7) is that households presently using
dropoff facilities may be revealing a relatively low travel cost associated with dropoff
recycling. The marginal value associated with curbside pickup (due to its added
convenience) is therefore likely to be lower for these households.
We turn next to the results for our tests of H1—i.e., the existence of positive
hypothetical bias. Estimation results for the Inter-Household Comparison, where the
binary participation variable is the dependent variable, are shown in table 2. The
important variable is the dummy variable SP, which equals one for those valuing the
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hypothetical CRP and zero otherwise. The SP variable is positive and statistically
significant, indicating an upward hypothetical bias in the SP data (i.e., we fail to reject
H1) after controlling for potential differences across households. However, as in
standard probit models, where the threshold value is not randomized, the coefficients are
only identifiable up to a scale factor involving the standard deviation of the error term.
Nonetheless, the marginal effect on the probability of the true WTP being greater than
$0.00 is identified. As shown in table 2, this estimate equals 0.17 and is statistically
significant at the 5% level. Thus, households making the hypothetical decision of
whether to participate in a CRP with no monthly fee are approximately 17% more likely
to participate, all else equal, than households making an actual decision to participate in a
similar program. We interpret this as evidence of positive hypothetical bias in the SP
data.
[Insert table 2]
Next, we consider the Intra-Household Comparison. Between the two voluntary
CRP communities in this sub-sample, there were 190 households that stated they knew a
CRP existed in their respective communities. Of these 190 households, 59 (31%) placed
themselves in intervals implying a true WTP value that is higher than the fee, but failed
to participate in the program. The mean difference between the stated WTP (using the
more conservative lower bound of the intervals) and the CRP fee for these nonparticipants was $6.99 per month. The magnitude of this difference indicates substantial
positive hypothetical bias associated with these 59 non-participants. Alternatively, there
were only six instances of downward hypothetical bias, whereby a participant stated a
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WTP amount less than the fee. In sum, these inter- and intra-household comparisons
support the hypothesis that positive hypothetical bias exists in our SP data.
Next, we consider the effect of short-scripted cheap talk in model (1). From table
1, notice that although cheap talk, on average, appears to mitigate hypothetical bias (i.e.,
the coefficient on CHEAP TALK is negative and equal to -$0.59), it is not statistically
different than zero at the 10% level. Therefore, we investigate the possibility (as
suggested in List) that cheap talk may be more effective for certain types of individuals.
Toward this end, we re-estimate model (1) and interact CHEAP TALK with several
individual characteristics. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are shown
in table 3. Notice that the coefficients on the interactive terms are negative and generally
larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the non-interactive term. Moreover, several
of the interaction terms are statistically significant. This indicates that certain types of
individuals (typically those stating relatively high WTP) are more prone to reduce their
stated WTP when receiving cheap talk. To our knowledge, this is the first evidence that
short-scripted cheap talk (for phone surveys) may reduce the effect of hypothetical bias.
[Insert table 3]

Conclusions and Policy Implications
Based on a sample of over 1,000 households from Utah, we find that the mean WTP for
curbside recycling is approximately $7.00 per month. Young, well-educated women who
are members of environmental organizations, who recycle out of an ethical responsibility
for the environment, who are not frequent dropoff users, and who reside in large
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households are willing to pay the most for a curbside service. Further, using combined
SP-RP data we find statistically significant positive hypothetical bias in the SP data. We
are able to partially mitigate this bias by introducing short-scripted “cheap talk” reminder
statements to a subset of households that currently do not participate in a CRP prior to the
valuation questions.
The WTP estimates presented above (with or without cheap talk) may represent
overly optimistic values for risk-averse policymakers who are concerned about
overstating projected revenues. To generate a more conservative WTP estimate using the
preference-certainty information, we re-coded the valuation responses in a manner
similar to Champ et al., Blumenschein et al., Carson et al. (1998), and Berrens et al. In
our re-coding scheme, we assume that WTP* is in the (0, τL) region for all households
that stated they were “unsure” of their responses to the valuation questions. Using this
approach, the estimated mean WTP in model (1) for the sub-sample who received the
preference-certainty questions falls $0.29, from $7.00 to $6.71 per month. In sum, by
setting CHEAP TALK equal to one, re-coding the WTP data using the preferencecertainty information, and adjusting for an over sampling of females, the predicted WTP
for curbside recycling in model (1) falls by $0.59, $0.29, and $0.12, respectively, for an
overall reduction of $1.00 per month.
Local policymakers can use our analysis to estimate a revenue function that
relates projected revenues to recycling fees. In figure 1, we present a graph relating
projected revenues from a voluntary CRP to a range of fees. Projected revenues are
calculated using our estimates from the entire sample under the assumption that
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households will participate if their predicted WTP is greater than the fee. The product of
the fee and the number of participating households then gives total projected revenue.
[Insert figure 1]
Coupled with data on the projected costs of providing a curbside recycling service
in their community, policymakers can equate the incremental cost and revenue associated
with providing the service to additional individuals (through the relationship between fee
and participation changes) to determine the efficient allocation of resources toward
curbside recycling.
Future research on these issues should proceed along two lines. First, a broader
study of household recycling behavior should be undertaken at a larger regional or
national level to test the robustness of the welfare estimates presented in this paper.
Second, the effects of cheap talk in mitigating hypothetical bias deserve further testing.
Short-scripted cheap talk was found to be effective in mitigating bias for certain types of
households in this data set. Future studies might vary the nature and length of the script
to examine its marginal effectiveness in mitigating hypothetical bias.
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Footnotes
1

Based on our own survey of a random sample of recycling coordinators

throughout 17 western U.S. states.
2

Our definition of hypothetical bias encompasses any deviation of an individual’s

stated WTP from their true WTP that is due to the hypothetical nature of the good. With
this definition, hypothetical bias could arise from households’ incentives to influence
policy decisions (frequently referred to as strategic bias). The distinction between
hypothetical and strategic bias has been extensively reviewed in the CVM literature.
Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze, and Freeman originally suggested that strategic bias
can be reduced by careful design of the survey instrument. Their specific criteria have
been repeated by Arrow et al. and Hanemann. Our survey generally meets these criteria.
One implication from the recent literature, however, is that strategic and hypothetical
biases are in some sense substitutable for one another (Carson, Groves, and Machina).
For instance, any attempt to reduce strategic bias by construing the survey as purely
hypothetical or “inconsequential” to policy decisions will tend to increase hypothetical
bias. Conversely, any attempt to reduce hypothetical bias by tying the survey more
closely to policy decisions may contribute to strategic bias. Although our survey
instrument states “we are conducting a scientific survey for professors at . . . ,” it does not
explicitly state that policy decisions will not be influenced by survey responses.
Furthermore, we provide plausible prices for curbside recycling, which is a service that
households are generally familiar with, either through direct participation in their
community’s CRP or through participation in a similar weekly curbside garbage pickup.
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Therefore, while we acknowledge that our estimates may contain strategic bias, they are
unlikely to suffer from the problem sometimes associated with CVM survey designs that
make the scenario seem entirely inconsequential to the respondent. We thank an
anonymous referee for alerting us to this issue.
3

In this study, opening bids were randomly chosen integers from $2 to $10,

reflecting the approximate range of values for actual CRPs in our sample.
4

Some respondents answered “Don’t Know” to one or more of the valuation

questions. For these households, their unknown WTP does not fit into one of the five
categories, but instead overlaps one or more of the intervals. For example, if a
respondent answered “Don’t Know” to whether they would be willing to pay $τ and
“Yes” to whether they would be willing to pay $τL, their unknown WTP falls in the
region (τL, ∞). The likelihood function is then adjusted accordingly.
5

Unlike the SLC program, the hypothetical CRP did not include a one-time $6

fee. There are two reasons why this may not significantly affect our results. First,
microeconomic theory tells us that marginal (rather than fixed) fees determine
consumers’ decisions. Second, a one-time $6 fee is rather small relative to the income
levels of our households, especially when spread over several months of service.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the one-time fee matters in households’ decisions, it
suggests that our estimates of hypothetical bias could be considered upper-bound
estimates.
6

Ideally, we would include RP data from communities other than Salt Lake City.

By doing so, we would improve our ability to detect hypothetical bias in two ways. First,
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variation in recycling fees across communities would allow us to identify the scale
parameter (1/σ) in our likelihood function and thus directly estimate the magnitude of
potential hypothetical bias. Second, we would be able to make more precise statements
about the extent of potential hypothetical bias at other bid levels. Since we employ SP
and RP data exclusively at the $0 level (recall that there is no monthly fee for SLC
households), the estimates of hypothetical bias are only suggestive of the degree of bias
at other bid levels. Unfortunately, our inter-household comparison precludes us from
using RP data from communities other than SLC because our sample contains only three
other communities with voluntary CRPs. Two of the three are relatively small
communities and as a result of proportionate sampling, we have insufficient observations
for econometric analysis. In the third community, the voluntary CRP is substantially
different from the one described in the hypothetical program and therefore these
responses are not directly comparable to the SP responses.
7

Copies of the survey instruments are available upon request.

8

OSRL uses random-digit-dialing to select households into the sample, and the

computer-aided-telephone-interviewing system (CATI) for interviewing and recording
responses (http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~osrl/).
9

Ultimately, only households stating values between $2 and $10, which conform

to the range of opening bids for the hypothetical CRP, are included in the econometric
analysis.
10

Although approximately 1,000 households were sampled, only 876 provided

usable information for the econometric analysis.
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11

We also estimated equation (1) using only the first WTP question to form a

single-bounded dichotomous choice model. Our primary econometric results are robust
to this change.
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Table 1. Estimation Results for the DBDC WTP Model (n= 876)
Explanatory
Variables

Descriptive Statistics

Estimates

Mean

Sample Size

Coefficient

P -Value

Ethical Duty

0.8978

871

3.184***

(0.000)

Monetary

0.7971

818

1.112

(0.137)

Primarily Ethics

0.6844

583

1.235***

(0.004)

Dropoff

0.8151

795

0.574

(0.121)

Dropoff User

0.3787

647

-0.926**

(0.015)

Young

0.3196

876

2.643***

(0.000)

Old

0.1450

876

-1.850***

(0.001)

Male

0.3619

876

-0.900***

(0.008)

High School

0.2592

872

-0.186

(0.404)

Associates

0.3704

872

-0.126

(0.434)

Bachelors

0.2076

872

0.424

(0.304)

Graduate

0.0940

872

1.864**

(0.029)

Household Size

3.2255

869

0.258***

(0.006)

Environ. Org.

0.0708

876

1.291**

(0.039)

Med Income

0.4203

759

0.057

(0.459)

High Income

0.3953

759

0.608

(0.154)

Cheap Talk

0.5000

258

-0.587

(0.159)

Fee Understated

0.5614

22

-1.667*

(0.054)

Fee Overstated

4.1400

84

0.403**

(0.037)

Fee Known

0.4473

237

-1.052

(0.152)

Heteroscedasticity Variables
Constant

1.0000

876

2.434***

(0.000)

Cheap Talk

0.5000

258

-0.422**

(0.011)

Bid

5.0171

876

0.126***

(0.000)

Very Sure

0.4747

375

0.000

(0.499)

Somewhat Sure

0.3200

375

-0.089

(0.334)

Not Sure

0.0933

375

-0.385

(0.140)

Mean WTP

$7.00 / month
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Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. The dependent variable is WTP. The results for variables such as the constant,
“Don’t Know” and community dummies are not shown. The heteroscedasticity and overall
likelihood ratio statistics are 65.11 and 201.70, respectively. McFadden’s pseudo R2’s is 0.080.
The number of correct predictions is 41%. The varying sample sizes for the means reflects the
elimination of “Don’t Know” responses, refusal to answer, or households that did not receive the
survey question.	
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Table 2. Estimation Results for Inter-Household Detection of Hypothetical Bias
Explanatory Variables

Coefficient

P-Value

1.324***

(0.000)

Monetary

0.246

(0.275)

Primarily Ethics

0.009

(0.486)

Dropoff

-0.302

(0.119)

-0.610***

(0.002)

Young

-0.050

(0.412)

Old

0.027

(0.453)

Male

-0.160

(0.181)

High School

-0.114

(0.366)

Associates

0.138

(0.335)

Bachelors

0.138

(0.347)

Graduate

0.158

(0.338)

Household Size

-0.022

(0.327)

Med Income

0.065

(0.383)

High Income

0.173

(0.233)

Fee Known

-0.097

(0.355)

Fee Overstated

-0.049*

(0.054)

SP

0.495*

(0.062)

Marginal Effect

P-Value

0.170**

(0.049)

Ethical Duty

Dropoff User

Prob(WTP* > $0 | SP) –
Prob(WTP* > $0 | RP)

Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. The estimates are obtained via probit estimation for the decision whether to
participate in a CRP. The estimated coefficients associated with community dummy variables
are excluded. The number of RP and SP observations are 165 and 170, respectively. Standard
errors for the marginal effect are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 3. Interactive Cheap Talk Estimated Coefficients
Interaction Variables
None

Ethical
Duty

Primarily
Ethics

Young

Female

Graduate

Environ.
Org.

Dropoff
User

Coefficients

-0.587

-0.832*

-1.274*

-0.606

-0.922

-4.143**

-8.096**

-0.380

P Values

0.159

0.096

0.077

0.273

0.105

0.050

0.012

0.364

Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The
model is the same as reported in Table 2 except the cheap-talk binary variable is replaced with interactive
variables. The respective omitted categories are the variables interacted with those that did not get cheap
talk. 	
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